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AlThis volume revisits the mutually constitutive relationship between science and
capitalism from the seventeenth century to the present day. Adopting a global ap-
proach, we reject the notion that either science or capitalism can be understood
as stages of modernity that emerged in the West and subsequently engendered a
“Great Divergence” with the rest of the world. Instead, both science and capitalism
were historical institutions that arose in an imperial context of global exchange and
whose entanglement has been continuously remade. Rather than seek to explain ei-
ther the development of modern science as a product of economic forces or the diver-
gence of capitalist economies as a result of technical innovation, we want to empha-
size the knowledge work that has been a central feature of both modern science and
capitalism across the globe.This volume examines the relationship between two cultural institutions—science and
capitalism—that have proven enormously powerful in shaping the modern world.
Due to its considerable scope and signiﬁcance, scholars in the history and social stud-
ies of science have debated the exact nature of that relationship at least since the
1930s and 1940s, if not before. To be sure, then, ours is a massive and complex topic,
one whose elucidation far exceeds the scope of any one volume. It also admits of a
seemingly endless number of interpretations. But we nonetheless believe it is well
worth revisiting. That is the goal of this volume: to explore how, and the extent to
which, science and capitalism have been entangled with one another—historically,
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2 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERNot only are we convinced that exploring the science-capitalism nexus remains a
worthwhile endeavor, but we also believe that now is a particularly opportune time to
do so. For a start, recent developments within the world of science and technology
have brought economic issues to the forefront of our discipline’s attention. In a world
full of biotech spin-offs, technology-transfer ofﬁces, and patented gene sequences,
Robert K. Merton’s classic account of the scientiﬁc community as one whose norma-
tive structure effectively insulates its members from the demands of the marketplace
has come to seem increasingly out of touch.1 Indeed, some scholars have begun to
suspect the very nature and authority of science itself may have undergone a founda-
tional transformation.2 But while economists, business leaders, and politicians often
celebrate these changes in the name of a brave new “innovation economy,” scholars
of science and technology studies have been more interested in asking how a suppos-
edly objective and value-neutral process of knowledge making has contributed to the
creation of a deeply stratiﬁed society. Judging from the rich literature on biopiracy
and biocapitalism, agnotology and the social construction of ignorance, as well as
the toxic effects of the chemical industry and the use and abuse of big data, it is clear
that although the story is varied, complex, and context dependent, part of the answer
must involve the role capital often plays in shaping the research priorities of scien-
tists.3 These concerns have thus given rise to calls for a more inclusive and engaged
debate about knowledge in a democratic society, one that actively questions who is
and is not involved in decisions about what sorts of research should be conducted,
who pays for that research, and who ultimately suffers or beneﬁts as a result.4
While scholars of science and technology have increasingly turned their attention
to political economy, the panic of 2008 and the ensuing global debt crisis have had a1 Robert K. Merton, “Science and Technology in a Democratic Order,” J. Legal Polit. Sociol. 1
(1942): 115–26; Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Chi-
cago, 1973).
2 See, e.g., Daniel Lee Kleinman and Steven P. Vallas, “Science, Capitalism, and the Rise of the
‘Knowledge Worker’: The Changing Structure of Knowledge Production in the United States,” The-
ory Soc. 30 (2001): 451–92, on 481. See also Kleinman, Impure Cultures: University Biology and the
World of Commerce (Madison, Wis., 2003); Philip Mirowski, Science-Mart: Privatizing American
Science (Cambridge, Mass., 2011); Elizabeth Popp Berman, Creating the Market University: How
Academic Science Became an Economic Engine (Princeton, N.J., 2012); Steven Shapin, The Scientiﬁc
Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation (Chicago, 2008).
3 On biocapitalism and biopiracy, see Stefan Helmreich, “Blue-Green Capital, Biotechnological Cir-
culation and an Oceanic Imaginary: A Critique of Biopolitical Economy,” BioSocieties 2 (2007): 287–
302; Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492–
2000 (Cambridge, 1988); Londa Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the
Atlantic World (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and
Knowledge (Boston, 1997); Kaushik Sunder Rajan, Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life
(Durham, N.C., 2006). On agnotology, see Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway,Merchants of Doubt:
How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming
(New York, 2010); Robert Proctor and Londa L. Schiebinger, eds., Agnotology: The Making and Un-
making of Ignorance (Stanford, Calif., 2008). On toxicity, see Michelle Murphy, Sick Building Syn-
drome and the Problem of Uncertainty: Environmental Politics, Technoscience, and Women Workers
(Durham, N.C., 2006); Robert Proctor, Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and
the Case for Abolition (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2011). On big data algorithms, see the 2017 volume
of Osiris. For a broader critique of this history, see David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Tech-
nology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New York, 1977).
4 For classic accounts, see Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Fem-
inism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist Stud. 14 (1988): 575–99; Sandra G. Harding,
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991).
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INTRODUCTION 3similar effect within history departments as well, contributing to a wave of enthusi-
asm for a new brand of economic history that is often described as the history of cap-
italism. To the extent that it can be meaningfully distinguished from labor, business,
and economic history, the “new” history of capitalism attempts to bring the lessons of
social and cultural history to bear on the development of the modern economy. For
such a young subﬁeld, it has already generated a great deal of enthusiasm, even gar-
nering front-page coverage in the New York Times.5 Our aim in this volume is to take
into account the lessons that have been learned from both of these historiographic
traditions—the renewed attention to political economy among historians of science
and technology as well as the new history of capitalism—leveraging insights from
the past several decades of scholarship to revisit a classic debate about the way sci-
ence and capitalism have mutually informed one another.
Before delving into the details, we want to acknowledge that we are far from the
ﬁrst to examine the productive but controversial relationship between these two in-
stitutions. Often, previous scholars leveraged one side of the science-capitalism dyad
as an explanatory resource to account for the other. Early on, for example, Marxist
historians characterized the emergence of science in early modern Europe as a direct
by-product of concurrent transformations in the means of economic production.
Boris Hessen articulated a particularly outspoken version of this claim when he ex-
plained the “social and economic roots of Newton’s Principia” in explicitly materi-
alist terms as early as 1931, whereas less than a decade later, Edgar Zilsel contended
that modern science came into being when “the advance of early capitalistic society”
broke down traditional class barriers between scholars and artisans. Others drew sim-
ilar conclusions without invoking an explicitly Marxian logic, including the Austrian
economist Joseph Schumpeter, who proclaimed that modern science was produced
by “the spirit of rationalist individualism, the spirit generated by rising capitalism.”
More recently, Carolyn Merchant drew upon Zilsel’s research to formulate a power-
ful feminist interpretation of the Scientiﬁc Revolution, arguing that Bacon’s faith in
science to give mankind “dominion” over a passive and feminine nature derived in
part from capital’s emergent domination of labor.6 Despite their various differences,
what united all of these authors was a shared emphasis on the material base out of
which modern science developed.5 Jennifer Schuessler, “In History Departments, It’s Up with Capitalism,” New York Times, 6 April
2013, A1. For an introduction to the “new” history of capitalism, see Sven Beckert and Christine
Desan, American Capitalism: New Histories (New York, 2018); Beckert, “History of American Cap-
italism,” in American History Now, ed. Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr (Philadelphia, 2011); Kenneth
Lipartito, “Reassembling the Economic: New Departures in Historical Materialism,” Amer. Hist.
Rev. 121 (2016): 101–39; Seth Rockman, “What Makes the History of Capitalism Newsworthy?,”
J. Early Repub. 34 (2014): 439–66; Jeffrey Sklansky, “The Elusive Sovereign: New Intellectual
and Social Histories of Capitalism,”Mod. Int. Hist. 9 (2012): 233–48; Michael Zakim and Gary John
Kornblith, eds., Capitalism Takes Command: The Social Transformation of Nineteenth-Century Amer-
ica (Chicago, 2012).
6 Boris Hessen, “The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia,” in The Social and Eco-
nomic Roots of the Scientiﬁc Revolution, ed. Gideon Freudenthal and Peter McLaughlin (Dordrecht,
2009), 41–101; Edgar Zilsel, The Social Origins of Modern Science, ed. Diederick Raven, Wolfgang
Krohn, and R. S. Cohen (Dordrecht, 2000), 7; Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and De-
mocracy (New York, 1942), 124; Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the
Scientiﬁc Revolution (New York, 1980), chap. 7. See also J. D. Bernal, Science and Industry in the
Nineteenth Century (London, 1953).
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4 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERAnother classic approach tells a different story entirely, while maintaining a similar
logical structure: rather than embed science within its economic context, this litera-
ture invokes science to help account for the rise of modern capitalism. Mid-twentieth-
century theorists of economic “modernization” like W.W. Rostow, for example, iden-
tiﬁed “the gradual evolution of modern science and the modern scientiﬁc attitude” as
a decisive factor separating vibrant, capitalist economies from less dynamic predeces-
sors and alternatives. The generation of knowledge through scientiﬁc inquiry enabled
technological advances, increased productivity, and abetted the accumulation of cap-
ital, the argument went—all of which fueled the process and ethos of growth central
to the promise of capitalism. Among the foremost voices for this view was Simon
Kuznets, who wrote in 1966 that “one might deﬁne modern economic growth as
the spread of a system of production . . . based on the increased application of sci-
ence.”7 Moreover, central to this notion of modernization was the idea that science
originated in Europe and subsequently spread to the rest of the world through a pro-
cess of “diffusion.”8 Thus, rather than locate the Scientiﬁc Revolution within the con-
text of capitalism, this literature used it to explain the so-called Great Divergence be-
tween Europe and the rest of the world, about which we will have more to say in the
pages that follow.
In contrast to both of these classic approaches, recent scholarship tends to frame
the historical relationship between science and capitalism as a more nuanced and
complex affair. Still, perhaps because of differing social and institutional networks
stemming from distinct patterns in graduate training, it remains surprisingly rare to
ﬁnd truly symmetric analyses of the way these two institutions have developed in tan-
dem.9 One of the main contributions we hope to make with this volume is thus simply
to further integrate the history of science with the new history of capitalism. By em-
phasizing powerful points of synergy between the two ﬁelds, we would like to help
generate a more robust conversation across the disciplinary divide. In addition, how-
ever, we do want to offer a few more substantive contributions as well. These contri-
butions broadly fall into three clusters or categories. First, we want to stress that the
most useful way to understand the historical relationship between science and capi-
talism does not privilege one or the other side of the dyad, attempting to parse out the
unique causal or explanatory contributions of each. Rather, we feel that it is both
more important and fruitful to examine the ways in which science and capitalism
have been continually coproduced in a variety of contexts and time periods. Under-
standing the mutually constitutive entanglement of science and capitalism is an em-
pirical project; the best way forward is to accumulate a diverse array of examples
from which more speciﬁc themes, patterns, and trends may emerge over time.7 W. W. Rostow, “The Stages of Economic Growth,” Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., 12 (1959): 1–16, on
4; more generally, Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cam-
bridge, 1962). Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure: Selected Essays (London, 1966),
84; also quoted in Joel Mokyr, “Innovation in Historical Perspective: Tales of Technology and Evo-
lution,” in Technological Innovation and Economic Performance, ed. Benn Steil, David G. Victor,
and Richard R. Nelson (Princeton, N.J., 2002), 23–46, on 25. For a discussion of economic growth
as the essence of capitalism, see Timothy Shenk, “Apostles of Growth,” Nation, 5 November 2014.
8 See George Basalla, “The Spread of Western Science,” Science 156 (1967): 611–22.
9 For some recent, and notable, exceptions, see Dan Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered (Chi-
cago, 2015); Eli Cook, The Pricing of Progress: Economic Indicators and the Capitalization of Amer-
ican Life (Cambridge, Mass., 2017); Jamie L. Pietruska, Looking Forward: Prediction and Uncer-
tainty in Modern America (Chicago, 2017).
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INTRODUCTION 5Second, we worry that, perhaps because of its Marxian roots, scholarship on the
way science and capitalism intersect often deploys a materialist ontology that down-
plays the importance of thinking. In contrast, we want to emphasize the role of cog-
nitive practices such as theorizing, calculating, and so on, in both the history of sci-
ence and capitalism. But we do not simply advocate a return to the history of ideas.
Instead, we look to scholarship on the material culture of science for inspiration on
how to break down the neat binary between thoughts and actions, words and things,
representation and reality on which the Marxian distinction between base and super-
structure ultimately relies.10 Texts, utterances, and other representational artifacts can
thus be regarded as real things in the world, whereas ways of knowing can be seen as
a form of cognitive labor. Not only should thinking, calculating, planning, forecast-
ing, organizing, and theorizing all be afforded a central place in the history of capi-
talism, we contend, but these seemingly abstract and disembodied activities can and
ought to be studied as genuine forms of practice with the power to produce far-reaching
effects in surprisingly distant parts of the world. This makes it possible to denaturalize
some of our culture’s most authoritative knowledge claims—rendering both modern
science and capitalism as a product of particular people with speciﬁc motivations in-
formed by their local circumstances—without denying how solid and durable those
knowledge claims often turn out to be.11
Last but not least, this volume seeks to challenge older assumptions about the spaces
and places in which both science and capitalism developed. Here our aim is to do more
than simply make evenhanded comparisons between different parts of the world. In-
stead, we want to insist that neither science nor capitalism can properly be said to have
“originated” in any particular place whatsoever, geographic or otherwise. As a great
deal of recent scholarship has been at pains to demonstrate, both institutions were
continually produced and re-produced through a global process of circulation. Thus,
in addition to moving beyond the laboratory and factory ﬂoor, this volume seeks to
treat both science and capitalism as transregional, indeed global, phenomena. Further,
in line with our desire to denaturalize both capitalist markets and scientiﬁc knowl-
edge, we resist the temptation to treat either science or capitalism as a universal cat-
egory, always and everywhere the same. Instead, both are historically contingent
products of local practices. Of course, we do not deny that both have acquired con-
siderable epistemic prestige and became geographically widespread. For that reason,
much of this volume is geared to addressing the way science and capitalism rose to
such power over the past several centuries, but without making teleological claims of10 The literature on new materialism is huge and getting bigger by the minute. In the history of sci-
ence, we ﬁnd the turn to study material culture especially useful. See, e.g., Peter Galison, Image and
Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago, 1997); Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Toward a His-
tory of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube (Stanford, Calif., 1997); Pamela
Smith, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientiﬁc Revolution (Chicago, 2004).
11 For more on the way scientiﬁc theorizing in particular can be studied as a form of cognitive prac-
tice, see, e.g., David Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Post-
war Physics (Chicago, 2005); Hélène Mialet, Hawking Incorporated: Stephen Hawking and the
Anthropology of the Knowing Subject (Chicago, 2012); Andrew Warwick, Masters of Theory: Cam-
bridge and the Rise of Mathematical Physics (Chicago, 2003). For an attempt to articulate a radically
materialist metaphysics, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia (Minneapolis, 1987); Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of
Objects (Chicago, 2002); Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency (London, 2008).
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6 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERinherently progressive development (or regressive fall from grace, as the case may
be).12
The rest of this introduction spells out these scholarly interventions in further de-
tail. But ﬁrst, one major caveat needs to be made explicit: because we regard science
and capitalism as historical entities that are continually enacted in practice, we delib-
erately resist the temptation to offer a stable deﬁnition of either. Instead, we treat both
as objects of empirical study. The point here is not to drain the key words in our title
of their meaning, insisting that all knowledge is scientiﬁc or every economy capital-
ist. Rather, it is to treat both cultural institutions as historically constituted entities.
That said, we do recognize several strands of similarity that create a kind of family
resemblance between different ways the political economy of modern capitalism
has been enacted and the epistemic ideals of modern science performed. For example,
capitalist societies are often described as ones in which markets play a central role as
the principal mechanism to coordinate between supply and demand. According to
Karl Polanyi, rather than embed the marketplace within a broader set of cultural in-
stitutions, modern capitalism reframes all manner of social interactions as market
transactions.13 For that reason, capitalist societies tend to regard individual liberty as
sacrosanct. They also feature strong legal regimes to protect private property and to
enforce contracts. Finally, capitalism extends the commodity-form to nearly all as-
pects of life, including “intellectual property.” But Polanyi’s emphasis on the cash
nexus as a mechanism for coordinating the circulation of commodities is not the
only way to understand what is speciﬁc about the political economy of modern cap-
italism. A different but equally longstanding tradition primarily regards capitalism as
an engine for the accumulation of wealth.14 On this view, capitalism should be under-
stood as a means to generate sustained growth by systematically using a portion of
today’s proﬁts to fund tomorrow’s productive enterprises. Money only becomes cap-
ital once it has been invested to expand the means of production. Insofar as it func-
tions as a technology for shaping the future, capital thus confers immense social and
political power. Moreover, absent a means of redistribution, capitalist economies tend
to concentrate wealth and often produce high levels of inequality. To borrow Thomas
Piketty’s evocative phrase, in capitalism, “the past devours the future.”15 But some-12 For an explicit defense of global history as an appropriate methodological framework for writing
the history of capitalism, see, e.g., Sven Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the
Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War,” Amer. Hist. Rev.
109 (2004): 1405–38; Beckert, “From Tuskegee to Togo: The Problem of Freedom in the Empire
of Cotton,” J. Amer. Hist. 92 (2005): 498–526. For more on the importance of circulation to the his-
tory of science, see, e.g., Aileen Fyfe and Bernard Lightman, Science in the Marketplace: Nineteenth-
Century Sites and Experiences (Chicago, 2007); David N. Livingstone, Putting Science in Its Place:
Geographies of Scientiﬁc Knowledge (Chicago, 2003); Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Cir-
culation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900 (Houndmills,
2007); James Secord, “Knowledge in Transit,” Isis 95 (2004): 654–72.
13 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York, 1944). On the question of valuation in
particular, see also Patrik Aspers and Jens Beckert, “Value in Markets,” in The Worth of Goods: Val-
uation and Pricing in the Economy (Oxford, 2011), 3–38. That said, the reduction to monetary value
has hardly gone uncontested. For a particularly vivid example, see Viviana Zelizer, Morals and Mar-
kets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United States (New York, 1979).
14 Karl Marx et al., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (London, 1992). For a more
recent argument along these lines, see Fabian Muniesa, ed., Capitalization: A Cultural Guide (Paris,
2017).
15 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge,
Mass., 2014), 571.
This content downloaded from 128.059.222.107 on November 12, 2019 12:22:17 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
INTRODUCTION 7thing similar holds true for science as well. Not only do ideas circulate, but they are
also accumulated in “centers of calculation” such as museums, libraries, and all of the
other institutions that collectively make up the epistemic infrastructure for knowledge
production.16 Hence, scientiﬁc knowledge too is subject to both processes of circula-
tion and acts of accumulation, which, in turn, helps to explain the uneven distribution
of economic wealth and epistemic power.17
However we choose to describe the political economy of modern capitalism, one
thing is certain: its roots run far deeper and its reach is far more expansive than the
way we do business alone. Rather, capitalism may be likened to a Wittgensteinian
“form of life,” one that valorizes an impersonal, calculating sort of rationality as
the cornerstone of sound judgement. Of course, modern science often makes similar
claims for itself also, and it is widely invoked as both a model and litmus test of the
right way to reason.18 Thus, while we deliberately eschew making normative claims
about the correct way to demarcate the boundaries of either science or capitalism, we
recognize that both categories have been invested with considerable normative
power. Rather than engaging in boundary disputes about what truly constitutes sci-
ence or distinguishes capitalism, this volume therefore includes a number of essays
that explicitly ask how precisely these boundaries were policed and enacted in prac-
tice (Arunabh Ghosh’s piece on “capitalist” vs. “communist” statistics during the
mid-twentieth century and Julia Fein’s essay on the commodiﬁcation of specimens
in Stalinist Russia perhaps being the clearest examples).19 Not seeking to ignore nor-
mative questions and controversies, we regard precisely these kinds of debates as es-
pecially fruitful objects of empirical investigation, because they help to illuminate
how the changing relationship between science and capitalism was understood by
speciﬁc people at particular times in history.20
The decision to treat science and capitalism as hotly contested but historically con-
stituted categories also helps to delimit the chronological scope of this volume. Not
only do science and capitalism both have a performative dimension, informing peo-
ple’s behavior while shaping the institutions that materially govern our lives, but, in a
striking convergence, both also became objects of scholarly contemplation during the
long nineteenth century. In each case, this happened as part of an effort to distinguish
the right way to produce knowledge and the best way to organize a political economy.
For example, whereas a number of words deriving from the Latin scientia have been
used to characterize experiential knowledge of various kinds for hundreds of years,16 On “centers of calculation,” see Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1987). On
the infrastructure of knowledge production more broadly, see Lorraine Daston, ed., Science in the Ar-
chives: Pasts, Presents, Futures (Chicago, 2017); Joanna Radin, Life on Ice: A History of New Uses
for Cold Blood (Chicago, 2017).
17 See Jessica Ratcliff, “The Great Data Divergence: Global History of Science within Global Eco-
nomic History,” in Global Scientiﬁc Practice in an Age of Revolutions, 1750–1850, ed. Patrick Man-
ning and Daniel Rood (Pittsburgh, 2016), 237–54.
18 For a history of the “epistemic virtue” of objectivity in particular, see Lorraine Daston and Peter
Galison, Objectivity (New York, 2007).
19 Arunabh Ghosh, “Lies, Damned Lies, and (Bourgeois) Statistics: Ascertaining Social Fact in
Midcentury China and the Soviet Union”; Julia Fein, “‘Scientiﬁc Crude’ for Currency: Prospecting
for Specimens in Stalin’s Siberia,” both in this volume.
20 For more on this approach, see Thomas Gieryn, “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Sci-
ence from Non-Science,” Amer. Sociol. Rev. 48 (1983): 781–95; Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Sci-
ence: Credibility on the Line (Chicago, 1999).
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8 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERthere was no such thing as the “scientiﬁc method” (or the professional scientist, for
that matter) until historians and philosophers such as William Whewell began spec-
ulating about the best way to generate reliable knowledge. It was thus in a highly pre-
scriptive context that the notion of science as detailed and factual knowledge pro-
duced through an objective process of rigorous hypothesis testing arose.21 The case
of “capitalism” is even more clear. Although the word “capital” had long been used
to denote assets, money, or commodities more broadly and “capitalist” as anyone
who dealt in or otherwise had access to capital, the neologism “capitalism” was de-
liberately coined by mid-nineteenth-century radicals such as Proudhon and Marx to
criticize a form of social organization they viewed as ruthless, unjust, and ultimately
unstable. Before long, the word “capitalism” came into much wider use to describe a
distinctly modern political economy in which a calculative acquisitiveness informed
more and more everyday decision making.22 To borrow terminology from Hallam
Stevens’s essay in this volume, both science and capitalism may therefore be said
to constitute a performance that takes place on the stage of everyday life: to be a sci-
entist or a capitalist is to perform a particular role in society.23 And such performances
only became possible once an appropriate “script”was available. For example, a large
number of observers since Marx have pointed out that to be a capitalist is to be a par-
ticularly future-oriented cognitive agent, always projecting oneself into an imagined
space where present investments may generate proﬁts or incur losses.24 Because this
mercantile practice of projecting oneself into an imagined future was transferred to the
creation of large-scale industrial endeavors during the long nineteenth century, the
bulk of the essays that make up this volume concern events and circumstances that
range from that period to the present day.
Once science and capitalism became objects of knowledge, their histories were
also subjected to intense scrutiny and debate. In another striking convergence, the or-
igins of both were then traced back to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. As
this happened, both categories became means for distinguishing between the ancient
and modern, the developed and primitive, the West and the rest, meaning that a fairly
provincial script was used to appraise the knowledge-making and wealth-generating
performances of people outside nineteenth-century Europe. Given this fraught histo-
riographic terrain, we would have been remiss in ignoring the relationship between21 Henry M. Cowles, “The Age of Methods: William Whewell, Charles Peirce, and Scientiﬁc
Kinds,” Isis 107 (2016): 722–37; Sydney Ross, “Scientist: The Story of a Word,” Ann. Sci. 18
(1962): 65–85; Richard Yeo, Deﬁning Science: William Whewell, Natural Knowledge and Public De-
bate in Early Victorian Britain (Cambridge, 2003).
22 Werner Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus (Leipzig, 1902); Max Weber, Die protestantische
Ethik, und der Geist des Kapitalismus (Tübingen, 1905). For a brief history of the word “capitalism,”
see the introduction to Jürgen Kocka, Capitalism: A Short History, trans. Jeremiah Riemer (Princeton,
N.J., 2016). See also Kocka and Marcel van der Linden, eds., Capitalism: The Reemergence of a His-
torical Concept (London, 2016).
23 See Hallam Stevens, “Starting up Biology in China: Performances of Life at BGI,” in this vol-
ume; Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, N.Y., 1959); Richard
Schechner, Performance Studies: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York, 2006). For an inﬂuential ap-
plication of performance studies to the practice of science, see Stephen Hilgartner, Science on Stage:
Expert Advice as Public Drama (Stanford, Calif., 2000).
24 Jens Beckert, Imagined Futures: Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics (Cambridge,
Mass., 2016), 1–2. For a similar kind of analysis, see Jonathan Levy, “Capital as Process and the His-
tory of Capitalism,” Bus. Hist. Rev. 91 (2017): 483–510; Fabian Muniesa, ed., Capitalization: A Cul-
tural Guide (Paris, 2017). Finally, see also Cook, The Pricing of Progress (cit. n. 9).
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INTRODUCTION 9knowledge and commerce in other places and time periods. For that reason, we have
also made sure to include a number of essays that cover events and developments
prior to the nineteenth century and outside of Europe, without thereby seeking to pro-
duce an origin story for either science or capitalism. Instead, our aim is to show how
epistemic and commercial values—matters of fact and matters of exchange—int-
ersected in other time periods and geographies also. What is more, several of the es-
says that follow go further and adopt an explicitly transnational focus, showing how
knowledge and proﬁts were both generated through encounters and interactions be-
tween people from different parts of the globe.
Finally, we would like to zoom out somewhat to discuss the organization of our
table of contents as a whole. This volume begins with a wide-ranging historiograph-
ical think piece from Harold J. Cook, which we intend as a “companion piece” to this
introduction.25 Next, we have chosen to group the rest of this volume’s essays accord-
ing to the different kinds of entanglements they most clearly address as a way to high-
light the centrality of the entanglement concept to our way of thinking. Of course, it
goes without saying that each of these essays speaks to more than just one kind of
entanglement. Hence, they could have been organized into different clusters as well.
Nonetheless, we do hope the organization of our table of contents will prove both
interesting and illuminating to readers. The ﬁrst of these clusters consists of three es-
says that, in one way or another, discuss the cognitive and manual labor that is re-
quired to not only create but also maintain the various kinds of infrastructures that
support the entanglement between science and capitalism. The second cluster groups
together three essays that all deal with a particular kind of knowledge work (indeed,
what may be the most iconic and well-known kind of knowledge work) that has
shaped the way economic transactions are carried out: calculation. Third, there is a
larger cluster of ﬁve essays that all address how the entangled histories of science
and capitalism have helped to give rise to new kinds of objects, entities, or relation-
ships in the world, ranging from the Comstock Lode to the accident-prone driver,
among several others. Finally, there is another cluster of three essays that all fore-
ground the transnational entanglement between science and capitalism, connecting
events, people, and processes in Europe and North America with Asia. We hope
the contributions will help strengthen the volume’s three principal scholarly interven-
tions, each of which are discussed in more detail next.
DIVERGENCE AND ENTANGLEMENT
Whereas this volume deliberately eschews the question of when science truly began,
or how capitalism really got started, others often invoke the rise of modern science to
explain the so-called Great Divergence (or “Enrichment”) that took place between
Europe and the rest of the world during the long nineteenth century. Economic his-
torians drawing upon the work of Douglass C. North, for example, emphasize the sig-
niﬁcance of formal and informal institutions in creating the conditions for growth and
prosperity. Besides the creation of a strong system of private property law, a habit of
plain dealing, and a valorization of thrift, these historians often cite a love of learn-25 Harold J. Cook, “Sciences and Economies in the Scientiﬁc Revolution: Concepts, Materials, and
Commensurable Fragments,” in this volume.
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10 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERing, a unique openness to useful ideas, and a constant desire to devise better ways of
getting things done as direct contributions to the creation of modern capitalism.26
One of the most strident articulations of such an argument is by Joel Mokyr, who
attributes the disproportionate economic success of Europe and North America to
their exceptional culture. As recently as 2016, Mokyr argued that it was technological
innovation that primarily fueled the Great Divergence: “the explosion of technolog-
ical progress in the West was made possible by cultural changes,” he contends,
which “affected technology both directly, by changing attitudes toward the natural
world, and indirectly, by creating and nurturing institutions that stimulated and sup-
ported the accumulation and diffusion of ‘useful knowledge.’”27 For a number of
complex and interrelated reasons that included a faith in progress and concomitant
irreverence for the wisdom of ancients, these cultural changes took place in Europe.
As a result, it was Europe (as well as its former colonies in North America) that di-
verged from the rest of the world.28
The notion that uniquely Western cultural innovations were primarily responsible
for the Great Divergence has not escaped criticism, however. For example, economic
historians informed by world systems theory have tried to “reorient” both economic
and world history to demonstrate the crucial role of non-Western societies in the mak-
ing of the early modern and modern world.29 By establishing Asia as one of many
centers in the early modern global economy, they effectively provincialize narratives
of the European miracle and Western exceptionalism in the history of capitalism.30
But these histories remain fundamentally comparative in their approach, and one
can even detect the specter of civilizational comparisons in some attempts to identify26 See, e.g., Stephen H. Haber et al., eds., Political Institutions and Financial Development (Stan-
ford, Calif., 2008); Deirdre N. McCloskey, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institu-
tions, Enriched the World (Chicago, 2016); McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t
Explain the Modern World (Chicago, 2010); Douglass C. North, “Institutions,” J. Econ. Perspect.
5 (1991): 97–112; North, “Institutions, Ideology, and Economic Performance,” Cato J. 11 (1992):
477–96; North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton, N.J., 2005); North, John
Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, “A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human
History” (working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006).
27 Joel Mokyr, A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton, N.J., 2016), 7.
28 See also Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: The Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy
(Princeton, N.J., 2002); Margaret C. Jacob and Larry Stewart, Practical Matter: Newton’s Science
in the Service of Industry and Empire (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy:
An Economic History of Britain 1700–1850 (New Haven, Conn., 2009); Jacob, The First Knowledge
Economy: Human Capital and the European Economy, 1750–1850 (Cambridge, 2014). For a recent
review of economic and economic-historical literature on this subject, see Cormac Ó Gráda, “Did Sci-
ence Cause the Industrial Revolution?,” J. Econ. Lit. 54 (2016): 224–39.
29 Key scholars associated with this approach include Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hege-
mony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350 (Oxford, 1991); Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global
Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Diver-
gence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, N.J., 2000), among
others. For more on the world systems theory approach to global inequality, see Daniel Chirot and
Thomas D. Hall, “World-System Theory,” Annu. Rev. Sociol. 8 (1982): 81–106; Immanuel Maurice
Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 4 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2011); Wallerstein, The
Essential Wallerstein (New York, 2000).
30 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence (cit. n. 29) may be the most inﬂuential study to make this ar-
gument. Others include Roy Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Chang and the Limits of Eu-
ropean Experience (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997). See also Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money
and Monetary Policy in China, 1000–1700 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1996), which demonstrates
late Ming China’s massive appetite for imported silver from the Americas and its far-reaching conse-
quences for the globalization of the early modern world economy.
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INTRODUCTION 11an Asian age as an alternative to Euro-American versions of capitalism and industri-
alization.31 As such, many world systems theorists cannot be said to fully reject the
fundamental units of analysis—the “West” and the “rest”—that underlie triumphalist
accounts of European exceptionalism. Finally, while there is no denying that many
areas of Europe and North America became far richer and more commercially pow-
erful than other parts of the world during the past three or four centuries, narratives of
divergence tend to pay less attention to the way global capitalism was continually be-
ing made and remade after the point of divergence.32 Ironically, insofar as they ne-
glect non-Western players as active agents in the global economy after the point of
divergence, these narratives fail to account for the dynamic and truly global character
of modern capitalism during all periods of its development.
A more recent critique of the Great Divergence argument has been articulated by
historians of capitalism who insist that slavery, imperialism, and other means of co-
ercive value extraction must be placed at the center of any narrative about the phe-
nomenal enrichment of Europe and North America between the seventeenth and late
nineteenth centuries.33 In his recent book on the worldwide web of cotton production,
for example, Sven Beckert coins the term “war capitalism” to describe the forceful
extraction and transfer of wealth from Asia, Africa, and the Americas that took place
during Europe’s “Age of Exploration.” In so doing, he explicitly emphasizes the ex-
tent to which violence, coercion, and political power were leveraged to build the ma-
terial infrastructure upon which free trade ideology has been erected.34 In this view,
the Great Divergence resulted not so much from an explosion in technical know-how
as from a willingness on the part of Europe’s imperial powers to bring their war-
making capacities to bear on extracting and channeling the world’s productive re-
sources to fuel their own economic development. Although this line of argument does
share some family resemblances with world systems theory, it avoids many of the pit-
falls that plague the comparative method by adopting a more truly transnational ap-
proach. Moreover, historians of capitalism also depart from world systems theory in
their tendency to foreground particular choices made by individual people working in
concert to further their interests over structural analyses of how the West came to
dominate the rest of the world.
The claim that modern capitalism was built on a foundation of imperial exploita-
tion, military expropriation, and coerced labor offers a welcome corrective to the tri-
umphalist narrative in which technological innovation primarily fueled economic31 For a study that seeks to reverse the comparative asymmetry in examining early modern world
economic development, see Wong, China Transformed (cit. n. 30). For a book that takes extra care to
choose comparable units of economic development for purposes of comparing world economic
change, see Pomeranz, The Great Divergence (cit. n. 29).
32 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence (cit. n. 29), for example, jumps at the end of the study from the
point of “divergence” during the eighteenth century to the twenty-ﬁrst century, when Asian global
economic dominance once again seems impossible to deny.
33 For more on the argument that slavery drove the development of North American capitalism in
particular, see, e.g., Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of
American Capitalism (New York, 2014); Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capital-
ism: A New History of American Economic Development (Philadelphia, 2016); Walter Johnson, River
of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, Mass., 2013); Peter
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hid-
den History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, 2000).
34 Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York, 2014).
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12 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERgrowth. But one might nonetheless worry that revisionist accounts go too far in writ-
ing the history of science and technology out of the story altogether. Kenneth Pome-
ranz, for example, makes the counterfactual claim that if China had access to the same
resources as the West, the Great Divergence might not have occurred. But this line of
reasoning neglects what one scholar refers to as the “human factor,” which gave rise
to a shift from appreciating coal as a resource upholding livelihood—a principal goal
of imperial statecraft during the late Qing Empire—to regarding it as a necessary fuel
for survival in an industrial world order.35 Perhaps even worse is that a failure to ad-
dress knowledge production leaves the history of capitalism vulnerable to the coun-
terfactual claim that absent the prevalence of coerced labor and imperial expropria-
tion, the Great Divergence would have still taken place.36
Ultimately, Great Divergence narratives largely ignore the degree to which science,
capitalism, and imperialism all coproduced one another. As a great deal of work in the
history of science makes abundantly clear, there is no separating imperial expansion
and commercial motives on the one hand from the production of useful knowledge on
the other.37 For example, Harold Cook’s inﬂuential account of the Dutch East India
Company’s scientiﬁc work convincingly demonstrates that without taking the “activ-
ities of commerce, including the trading ventures once called voyages of discovery”
into account, it would be very difﬁcult to answer the deceptively obvious question of
why such “an enormous amount of personal time and effort, and economic and other
resources, come to be devoted to seeking out and acquiring precise and accurate de-
scriptive information about natural things.”38 Thus, even if it were possible to elim-
inate imperialism from European history conceptually, there is no reason to suspect
that the institutions responsible for the growth of both modern science and the pro-
duction of new technologies would remain unchanged. Given how closely the prac-
tice of science and imperial statecraft were bound up with one another, it is impossi-
ble to maintain that one, not the other, must be afforded a primary causal role in
explaining the Great Divergence.
It is for precisely that reason that we favor the idiom of entanglement, which has
previously been put to powerful use by scholars such as Michelle Murphy, who draws
upon it to explain the complicated, transnational, and sometimes unsettling inter-35 See Shellen Wu, Empires of Coal: Fueling China’s Entry into the Modern World Order, 1860–
1920 (Stanford, Calif., 2015).
36 See, e.g., Deirdre N. McCloskey, “The Industrial Revolution, 1780–1860: A Survey,” in The Eco-
nomic History of Britain since 1700, ed. Roderick Floud and Deirdre N. McCloskey (Cambridge,
1981), 242–70. The controversy has become especially ﬁerce in debates about the importance of slav-
ery to the historical development of American capitalism in particular. See, e.g., Alan L. Olmstead,
review of The Half That Has Never Been Told, by Edward Baptist, J. Econ. Hist. 75 (2015): 919–
23. For an overview of the recent controversy, see Marc Parry, “Shackles and Dollars,” Chronicle
of Higher Education, 8 December 2016. For a methodological defense of the counterfactual method
for apportioning causal power, see Tim De Mey and Erik Weber, “Explanation and Thought Exper-
iments in History,” Hist. & Theory 42 (2003): 28–38.
37 See, e.g., Lucile Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of the British Royal Bo-
tanic Gardens (New York, 1979); Richard Drayton, Nature’s Government: Science, Imperial Britain,
and the “Improvement” of the World (New Haven, Conn., 2000); John Gascoigne, Science in the Ser-
vice of Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State and the Uses of Science in the Age of Revolution
(Cambridge, 1998); Lisbet Koerner, Linnaeus: Nature and Nation (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); Schie-
binger, Plants and Empire (cit. n. 3).
38 Harold John Cook,Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden
Age (New Haven, Conn., 2007), 45, 6.
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INTRODUCTION 13actions between reproductive health efforts, feminist political movements, techno-
science, capitalist enterprise, and American imperial ambitions in the 1970s and
1980s.39 Instead of trying to isolate direct causal inﬂuences, the idiom of entangle-
ment highlights complicated circuits, unanticipated trajectories, and feedback loops.
We argue that this idiom is particularly useful for exploring the interrelated develop-
ment of both science and capitalism for at least three key reasons. First, entanglement
emphasizes the complexity, contingency, and variety of relationships that make up
the science-capitalism nexus. To think of science and capitalism as entangled is to
suggest the futility of insisting that any one causal thread should have primacy over
another. Instead, doing so highlights the fact that, when viewed in detail in speciﬁc
contexts, the relationship between science and capitalism is highly convoluted and
does not follow any single prescribed path or trajectory. As Murphy notes, such en-
tanglements can be “uneasy,” and their ramiﬁcations unpredictable. Second, entan-
glement also offers a way to think about the durability of science and capitalism
by showing how they are often reinforced and strengthened through their interaction.
As anyone who owns a pair of earbuds will know, tangles are not only complex but
also intransigent. They tend not to untangle easily and thus can be hard to undo.
Third, entanglement offers a useful way—a useful “topology,” as Murphy puts it—
through which to think about the geographic spaces and scales across which science
and capitalism interact.40 As the essays in this volume show, science and capitalism
have often become wound together in distinctive and powerful ways within speciﬁc
local settings. But the threads that feed into those local knottings are also part of net-
works and circuits that far transcend the local and can be truly global. Perhaps most
important of all is that entanglement offers a useful idiom for thinking about science
and capitalism as part of the same, larger assemblage. Thus, rather than attempting to
parse out the relative importance or causal power of each, this volume instead wants
to suggest that both derive their considerable power and signiﬁcance from being so
readily, and so often, conjoined.
KNOWLEDGE WORK
If this volume’s ﬁrst scholarly intervention involves a shift from narratives of diver-
gence to ones that foreground entanglement, its second is to inquire into the cognitive
labor—what we call “knowledge work”—that generated many of the nodes around
which the history of science became so entangled with the history of capitalism.
To do so, we want to foreground speciﬁc practices more so than general ideas—fo-
cusing on the routinized activities that constitute economic life and scientiﬁc inquiry,
along with the material things through which those activities are conducted, the
“know-how” that makes them possible, the institutions and mores that structure them,39 Michelle Murphy, Seizing the Means of Reproduction: Entanglements of Feminism, Health, and
Technoscience (Durham, N.C., 2012). There is also a rich anthropological literature on entanglement,
notably as a way to theorize the interactions between different cultural groups (e.g., Western and non-
Western groups in colonial encounters) and between human social life and the material world. See
Nicholas Thomas, Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Paciﬁc
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991); Ian Hodder, “Human-Thing Entanglement: Towards an Integrated Archae-
ological Perspective,” J. Roy. Anthropol. Inst. 17 (2011): 154–77; Hodder, Entangled: An Archaeol-
ogy of the Relationship between Humans and Things (Malden, Mass., 2012).
40 Murphy, Seizing the Means (cit. n. 39), 11–21.
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14 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERthe emotions they elicit, and so on.41 Attention to practice has, of course, been one of
the deﬁning methodological trends in the history of science, especially since the 1990s,
when scholars turned to the close examination of scientiﬁc practice as a way forward
out of vexing disputes about the realism versus constructed-ness of scientiﬁc theories.
Something similar is true for the history of capitalism as well. To no small degree, the
history of capitalism and the history of science might therefore be written as histories
of gerunds: managing, planning, measuring, calculating, predicting, experimenting,
modeling, collecting, classifying, and so on, to name just a few. By studying these
technical practices “in action,” we can examine how seemingly natural, inevitable, or
“black-boxed” aspects of economic order or scientiﬁc knowledge were in fact the prod-
uct of local cultures, personal interests, contested choices, and historical contingencies.
In a word, we want to focus attention on the intellectual labor through which science
and capitalism were coproduced.
One broad realm of practice—one gerund—that offers an especially good oppor-
tunity for collaboration between historians of science and capitalism is, simply put,
thinking. Among the most impressive achievements of the historiography of science
has been the ability to show that scientiﬁc thinking does not simply proceed through
individual inspiration or relentless methodicality but is rather diverse, disorderly, and
surprising. Older histories of scientiﬁc ideas or scientiﬁc thought, understood as an
accretion of static units of knowledge, have long since given way to an image of sci-
entiﬁc thinking as a dynamic social and material process. By comparison, attention to
the dynamism and complexity of economic thinking is of a somewhat more recent
vintage. Dominant models of capitalism, both Marxist and neoclassical, long left rel-
atively little room for thinking as an open-ended and generative activity and thus
downplayed its signiﬁcance as an object of social and economic analysis. In Marxist
analyses, conscious acts of thinking have been seen as the expression of underlying
material interests and the class consciousness they beget. In neoclassical models, the
presumption is that all individuals, or at least those who move markets, act in ways
that maximize their self-interest; what they “think” they are doing is far less important
than what their economic choices reveal about their true preferences.
Yet recent scholarship, both in the new history of capitalism and in other ﬁelds like
economic sociology and anthropology, has put thinking back at the center of capital-
ist action, showing that economic actors are “subjects” and that capitalism is, in a pro-
found sense, an epistemic system.42 This effort to reopen the cognitive space of cap-
italism can be seen, for example, in the efforts of historians of capitalism to recover
how foundational concepts inmodern economic life—credit, risk, proﬁt, the economy,41 For a discussion of the value of studying practice in the history of capitalism, see Kenneth
Lipartito, “Connecting the Cultural and the Material in Business History,” Enterprise Soc. 14 (2013):
686–704. The literature on scientiﬁc practice is certainly far too vast to do justice to here. Some espe-
cially inﬂuential examples include Andrew Pickering, ed., Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago,
1992); Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life (Chicago,
1994); Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago, 1995); Galison, Image
and Logic (cit. n. 10).
42 On the importance of seeing economic actors as “not simple decision makers but also thinking
subjects,” see Hirokazu Miyazaki, Arbitraging Japan: Dreams of Capitalism at the End of Finance
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2013), 6. On experimental systems and epistemic things, see Rhein-
berger, Toward a History (cit. n. 10).
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INTRODUCTION 15and so on—have been forged, refashioned, and made durable.43 Or in the burgeoning
attention historians, including many historians of science, have paid to the details of
technical knowledge practices within business enterprises.44 Or in economic sociol-
ogy and science and technology studies (STS) research examining the complex as-
semblages of epistemic devices—economic models, evaluation techniques, calculating
instruments—that are needed to allow economic agents to make “rational” choices in
market settings.45 The list could be extended almost indeﬁnitely, and nearly all of the
essays in this volume have something to contribute to this conversation in one way or
another.
Several of our essays explicitly feature economic and scientiﬁc thinking as a form
of knowledge work. William Deringer, Martin Giraudeau, and Arunabh Ghosh focus
on how calculation, a crucial technical practice common to science and capitalism,
serves as a crucial site for the entanglement of both domains.46 All three challenge
the assumption that calculation is simply a mechanical expression of a unitary capi-
talist or scientiﬁc rationality and instead show that calculative practices are creative
and contested domains where actors experiment with different epistemologies and
explore alternative futures. A key theme in the chapters is the way that the authority of
calculators and calculative expertise is coproduced with visions of political-economic
order. In his essay, Deringer sheds light on the culture and nature of exchange among
British “men of science” between 1660 and 1720. He explains how two computa-
tional methods for dealing with annuities were presented as having mathematical in-
genuity and ﬁnancial utility in their promise to streamline many common ﬁnancial
transactions and why both were ultimately rendered obsolete for capitalist practice.
Giraudeau characterizes a text written in 1800 by Irénée Du Pont de Nemours, used
to raise funds for what was to become the Du Pont Corporation, as similar in kind to43 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley and Los Ange-
les, 2002), chap. 3; Carl Wennerlind, Casualties of Credit: The English Financial Revolution, 1620–
1720 (Cambridge, Mass., 2011); Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism
and Risk in America (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); Arwen Mohun, Risk: Negotiating Safety in American
Society (Baltimore, 2012); Levy, “Accounting for Proﬁt and the History of Capital,” Crit. Hist. Stud. 1
(2014): 171–214.
44 The literature on actuaries is especially extensive. See, e.g., Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Num-
bers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton, N.J., 1995), chap. 5; Timothy
Alborn, Regulated Lives: Life Insurance and British Society, 1800–1914 (Toronto, 2009), chap. 4;
Levy, Freaks of Fortune (cit. n. 43), chap. 3; Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered (cit. n. 9). An-
other notable example, among many, is credit scoring: Martha Poon, “Scorecards as Devices for Con-
sumer Credit: The Case of Fair, Isaac & Company Incorporated,” in “Market Devices,” ed. Fabian
Muniesa, Yuval Millo, and Michel Callon, suppl. 2, Sociol. Rev. 55 (2007): 284–306; Josh Lauer,
“Making the Ledgers Talk: Customer Control and the Origins of Retail Data Mining, 1920–1940,”
in The Rise of Marketing and Market Research, ed. Helmut Berghoff, Philip Scranton, and Uwe
Spiekermann (New York, 2012), 153–69.
45 This literature is vast, but see esp. Daniel Beunza and David Stark, “Tools of the Trade: The
Socio-Technology of Arbitrage in a Wall Street Trading Room,” Indust. Corp. Change 13 (2004):
369–400; Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets
(Cambridge, Mass., 2006); Alex Preda, “Socio-Technical Agency in Financial Markets: The Case
of the Stock Ticker,” Soc. Stud. Sci. 36 (2006): 753–82; Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, “Market De-
vices” (cit. n. 44); Trevor Pinch and Richard Swedberg, eds., Living in a Material World: Economic
Sociology Meets Science and Technology Studies (Cambridge, Mass., 2008); MacKenzie, Material
Markets: How Economic Agents Are Constructed (Oxford, 2009); Canay Özden-Schilling, “The In-
frastructure of Markets: From Electric Power to Electronic Data,” Econ. Anthropol. 3 (2016): 68–80.
46 William Deringer, “Compound Interest Corrected: The Imaginative Mathematics of the Financial
Future in Early Modern England”; Martin Giraudeau, “Proving Future Proﬁt: Business Plans as Dem-
onstration Devices”; both in this volume; see also Ghosh, “Lies” (cit. n. 19).
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16 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERdemonstration devices employed to assess proﬁt and loss by natural philosophers at
the time. Finally, Ghosh provides us with a Cold War case study that illustrates how
and why socialist statistics emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century as a “so-
cial science” to serve as a powerful antidote to bourgeois liberal mathematical statis-
tics. In doing so, he denaturalizes universalistic claims of liberal statistics that crucially
rested on purportedly “pure”methods of probabilistic thinking in order to identify the
ideological concerns behind them, including the desire on the part of capitalist states
to increase their control and modernize statecraft, a goal that they shared with social-
ist nations.
Collecting and accumulation are forms of knowledge work and practice often pos-
itively associated with modern scientiﬁc inquiry and capitalism. Courtney Fullilove,
Julia Fein, and Sarah Milov turn our attention to different forms of collecting ob-
jects—biomatter, natural history specimens, and epidemiological data—and consider
how such knowledge work functions to make or unmake commodities in particular
political economies.47 Fullilove’s essay features contemporary bioprospecting, the
collecting of pest-resistant cereal endophytes for capitalist purposes of proﬁt-oriented
international gene banks, outlining the emerging characteristics of the twenty-ﬁrst-
century political economy that underlies the practice and informs what biota are treated
as a commodity and why, as well as who beneﬁts and loses. Fein’s essay examines
howmaterial—in this case, “scientiﬁc crude,” or natural history specimens—is collected
for the purposes of turning it into a global commodity in, surprisingly, a communist
command economy. Examining the collection of such “crude” from the Siberian pe-
riphery during Stalin’s ﬁrst Five-Year Plan (1928–32), Fein speciﬁcally illustrates
how the socialist state mobilized the collection of such material originally to sell it
on the global market until Moscow ultimately shifted its policy toward requisitioning
the material away from the Siberian periphery to the center as a form of national her-
itage. Milov’s essay turns our attention to the unexpected transnational signiﬁcance of
data collection on wives of Japanese smokers. She shows how American tobacco that
ﬂowed into Japanese markets and lungs served as the basis of Japanese epidemio-
logical data, which, in turn, traveled back to the United States and was used by anti-
tobacco grassroots activists as evidence for public smoking bans against the interests
of big tobacco.
If calculation, classiﬁcation, and collection are relatively iconic forms of knowl-
edge work for scientiﬁc and capitalist endeavors, other contributors pay attention
to ways of knowing and acting that are not usually associated with the two domains.
Eugenia Lean and Hallam Stevens draw our attention to the act of copying, conven-
tionally reviled as a problematic practice obstructing innovation and free market dy-
namics in more hagiographic accounts of science and capitalism.48 Rethinking the
place and value of copying in scientiﬁc and capitalist innovation, both Lean and Ste-
vens draw on case studies from China, which has been targeted for engaging in ex-
ceptionally unethical copying since the late nineteenth century. By examining early
twentieth-century international disputes over alleged Chinese counterfeiting of Bur-47 Courtney Fullilove, “Microbiology and the Imperatives of Capital in International Agro-
Biodiversity Preservation,” in this volume; Fein, “ ‘Scientiﬁc Crude’” (cit. n. 19); Sarah Milov,
“Smoke Ring: From American Tobacco to Japanese Data,” in this volume.
48 Eugenia Lean, “Making the Chinese Copycat: Trademarks and Recipes in Early Twentieth-
Century Global Science and Capitalism,” in this volume; Stevens, “Starting” (cit. n. 23).
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INTRODUCTION 17roughs,Wellcome’s popular vanishing cream, Hazeline Snow, Lean shows how copy-
ing the product’s trademarks and adaptation of its recipes proved crucial in helping
Chinese merchants innovate their own products and compete globally in a competi-
tive pharmaceutical market. To stem this rising tide of Chinese manufacturing power,
Burroughs, Wellcome and other pharmaceutical companies aggressively promoted an
emerging intellectual property (IP) regime, identiﬁed Chinese copying as unethical,
and pursued alleged copycats. Stevens moves us forward in time to focus on how the
Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI), a DNA-sequencing research institute in contempo-
rary Shenzhen, engages in acts of adaptation to establish itself as a highly creative,
hybrid corporation that is competitive worldwide. Both contend that copying and in-
novation have not been mutually exclusive in modern science and capitalism and
show that while the Chinese actors they consider are savvy in their acts of adaptation,
they have never been singular in their copy work, because copying and adaptation
have taken place in all corners of the modern and contemporary world.
The laborious and unglamorous act of maintenance is another form of knowledge
work that has often been given short shrift in accounts of science and capitalism that
focus on revolutionary leaps in scientiﬁc invention and capitalist innovation. Here,
two of our contributors—Emily Pawley and David Singerman—focus their attention
on the knowledge and drudgery involved in the day-to-day and season-to-season pro-
cesses of engineering the reproductive capacities of sheep and the technical upkeep of
sugar machinery in capitalist industries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.49
Pawley’s account takes us to the ﬁelds of mid-eighteenth-century Britain, at a mo-
ment when the onset of new forms of “agricultural capitalism” was dramatically
transforming the way food was produced and eaten. Her study examines how agricul-
tural experts and practicing farmers built up a new body of natural knowledge about
livestock, aimed at producing tender bodies available at all times of the year to meet
the increasingly voracious demands of an emerging consumer market in meat. At the
center of this biological project were a battery of new techniques, including feeding
regimens and the design of natural landscapes, intended to direct and manage ani-
mals’ sexual desires and reform those occasionally recalcitrant beings into agreeable
producers of new animal bodies. Singerman’s “Sugar Machines” illustrates the var-
ious material parts and paper devices that Scottish engineers utilized in order to main-
tain and manage temperamental machines that were shipped to far-ﬂung environ-
ments in the Caribbean as the production of sugar had become increasingly global by
the nineteenth century. If scholars interested in global circulation of commodities and
knowledge have focused on the epistemic work that goes into creating standardized,
mobile units, Singerman shows that such standardized circuits were only possible be-
cause of the maintenance work done by technicians and engineers bearing highly spe-
cialized and often tacit forms of technical knowledge that deﬁed standardization.
Given the important contributions historians of science have made to the study of
thinking and knowing in practice, the recent surge of attention to the epistemic di-
mensions of capitalism offers an obvious opportunity for further collaboration. In
fact, historians of science and STS scholars have been key contributors to many of49 Emily Pawley, “Feeding Desire: Generative Environments, Meat Markets, and the Management
of Sheep Intercourse in Great Britain, 1700–1750”; David Singerman, “Sugar Machines and the Frag-
ile Infrastructure of Commodities in the Nineteenth Century,” both in this volume.
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18 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERthe key trends listed above—from the study of technical devices in shaping markets
and “futures” to agnotology. Yet this shared attention to the epistemic dimensions of
capitalism does not imply a desire to see the history of capitalism become a purely
intellectual history, or for scholars to neglect the material dimensions of life under
capitalism. One of the reasons historians of science can offer an especially useful per-
spective on economies past is precisely that they are used to reckoning yet another
entanglement, namely, the way “epistemic things” and material objects are constantly
commingled. One of the most provocative examples is the argument by STS scholars
like Michel Callon and Donald MacKenzie that economic models play a crucial role
in shaping how markets are constructed, the decisions economic actors can make, and
what forms of economic action are rational. At its strongest, this argument about the
“performativity” of economic models suggests that certain claims about how the eco-
nomic world operates, like the Black-Scholes-Merton model for pricing stock op-
tions, or “Moore’s law” regarding the development of the semiconductor industry,
may act as a self-fulﬁlling prophecy, meaning they have the power to reshape eco-
nomic phenomena in their own image.50 While this performativity thesis has gener-
ated much debate, it offers a vital reminder that, to borrow a different idiom, economic
order is coproduced with economic knowledge—and an invitation to historians of sci-
ence to help explain such historical entanglements.51
Thus, this volume does not only seek to treat knowledge work as a practice, a form
of intellectual labor. Our aim is also to lay bare the deep entanglement between words
and things, theory and reality, epistemology and ontology. Indeed, several essays in
this volume even go so far as to argue that cognitive practices can lead to the creation
of new entities and relationships in the world. To highlight this point and make it ex-
plicit, we have chosen to group some of the essays into a section on “Entangled On-
tologies.”52 For example, Lee Vinsel’s essay on auto regulation shows how a group of
industrial psychologists created a lucrative niche from which to augment their profes-
sional power by arguing that a new technology, the automobile, led to the creation of
a new kind of person, the accident-prone driver. Similarly, Victoria Lee tracks the
way science as an institution of epistemic authority and the microbe as an object
of knowledge coproduced one another in late Meiji Japan. Paul Lucier shows how the
involvement of geologists in the practice of what he provocatively calls “Comstock
Capitalism” led to the consolidation of a new, material entity: the single, continuous,50 Michel Callon, “Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics,” in The
Laws of the Markets, ed. Michel Callon (Oxford, 1998), 1–57; MacKenzie, Engine (cit. n. 45); Donald
MacKenzie, Fabien Muniesa, and Lucia Siu, eds., Do Economists Make Markets? On the Per-
formativity of Economics (Princeton, N.J., 2007), esp. the chapter by Callon, “What Does It Mean
to Say Economics Is Performative?,” 311–57; Peter Miller and Ted O’Leary, “Mediating Instruments
and Making Markets: Capital Budgeting, Science and the Economy,” Account. Org. Soc. 32 (2007):
701–34; Franck Cochoy, Martin Giraudeau, and Liz McFall, “Performativity, Economics, and Poli-
tics: An Overview,” J. Cult. Econ. 3 (2010): 139–46. For a notable critique, see Philip Mirowski
and Edward Nik-Khah, “Markets Made Flesh: Performativity, and a Problem in Science Studies, Aug-
mented with Consideration of the FCC Auctions,” in MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu, Do Economists
Make Markets?, 190–224.
51 Sheila Jasanoff, “The Idiom of Co-Production,” in States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of
Science and Social Order, ed. Sheila Jasanoff (London, 2004), 1–12.
52 Victoria Lee, “The Microbial Production of Expertise in Meiji Japan”; Lee Vinsel, “‘Safe Driving
Depends on the Man at the Wheel’: Psychologists and the Subject of Auto Safety, 1920–55”; Paul
Lucier, “Comstock Capitalism: The Law, the Lode, and the Science”; Lukas Rieppel, “Organizing
the Marketplace,” all in this volume; Fein, “ ‘Scientiﬁc Crude’” (cit. n. 19).
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INTRODUCTION 19extremely valuable, and thus hotly contested “Comstock Lode.” Finally, Fein shows
how a new kind of commodity—scientiﬁc crude—was created in response to Stalin’s
ﬁrst Five-Year Plan during the early twentieth century, whereas Lukas Rieppel argues
that as a new science of life came into being around the turn of the nineteenth century,
organization was refashioned from a feature or property of living beings to a thing in
itself—the organism—whose functional integration subsequently came to serve as a
model for business organization, especially in the context of large, multidivisional
corporate ﬁrms. Several other essays in the volume that are not explicitly grouped
into this category also discuss the creation of new entities that have emerged with
the modern entanglement of science and capitalism. All share the concern of shed-
ding light on how the imperatives of science and capitalism resulted in the articula-
tion of new social roles (the accident-prone driver, the Chinese copycat, the scientist)
and objects of knowledge (the microbe, socialist statistics, organization) that, in turn,
profoundly shaped concrete material practices as well as political and economic re-
lationships, both local and global.
CIRCUITS OF EXCHANGE
Our third scholarly intervention involves adopting a global approach to the study of
the entanglement of science and capitalism from the early modern period to the
twenty-ﬁrst century. We are indebted to developments in both the history of capital-
ism and the history of science ﬁelds. Historians of capitalism have long adopted a
global purview, even as some have remained more comparative in their approach.53
But, as noted above, some recent historians of capitalism are moving beyond com-
parative methods by paying attention to what were often violent transnational and
global relations in the production of commodities like cotton.54 Similarly, the history
of science has increasingly adopted a more global approach in seeking to unravel tri-
umphalist narratives that see the scientiﬁc and industrial revolutions as somehow
unique to the West, or as automatically desirable and inexorable. If revisionist histo-
rians of capitalism have helpfully shed light on how early modern circuits of silver
and modern commodities have ﬂowed in multiple directions, historians of science
have been particularly effective in attending to the global movement of knowledge.
Some have engaged in more theoretically oriented inquiries to conduct a sustained
conversation about how fundamentally interconnected the world has been in the mak-
ing of modern science. Postcolonial scholars of science and medicine, for example,
have been among the most critically engaged in articulating the moral imperative to53 The comparative approach is especially clear in the “varieties of capitalism” literature. See, e.g.,
John R. Bowman, Capitalisms Compared: Welfare, Work, and Business (Los Angeles, 2014); Barry
Stewart Clark, The Evolution of Economic Systems: Varieties of Capitalism in the Global Economy
(New York, 2016); David Coates, ed., Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Approaches (New York,
2005); Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Founda-
tions of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, 2001); David Hundt and Jitendra Uttam, Varieties of Cap-
italism in Asia: Beyond the Developmental State (London, 2017); Martha Prevezer, Varieties of Cap-
italism in History, Transition and Emergence: New Perspectives on Institutional Development (New
York, 2017).
54 There have been criticisms of Beckert’s important work, however. For a Marxist-inﬂected critique
that demands a more explicit theorization of valuation in the discussion of capitalism, see Aaron G.
Jakes and Ahmad Shokr, “Finding Value in Empire of Cotton,” Crit. Hist. Stud. 4 (2017): 107–36. In
addition, it has also been noted that Beckert fails to address the ecological implications of cotton
emerging as a quintessential commodity in war capitalism.
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20 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERchallenge Eurocentric narratives that posit howmodern science emerged singularly in
the West and was subsequently exported abroad, rendering it challenging to even dis-
tinguish “Western” from “non-Western” science.55 Warwick Anderson insists on “a
critical engagement with the present effects . . . of centuries of ‘European expansion’”
to decenter “conventional accounts of so-called ‘global’ technoscience, revealing and
complicating the durable dichotomies [of global/local, ﬁrst world/third world, West-
ern/indigenous, and big science/small science], produced under colonial regimes, which
underpin many of its practices and hegemonic claims.”56
Explorations into the motifs of circulation, movement, and exchange have taken up
such a task by providing a powerful framework from which to complicate such du-
rable dichotomies. Because knowledge only becomes recognized as such once it has
been widely shared within a community of knowing subjects, circulation is now
widely seen to be part and parcel of how knowledge is made, not just an afterthought.
The importance of this insight can hardly be overstated, particularly given the meth-
odological space it has opened for writing a global history of science that does not
valorize the importance of Europe and North America over the rest of the world.
There is also now considerable recognition that knowledge about the natural world
emerged through encounters and exchanges between people from all parts of the
globe, not just between Europe and the “rest.”57 Finally, related efforts have focused
on the way global brokers or mediators facilitated the circulation of knowledge, often
in ways that move beyond a strict metropole-colony axis.58 Rather than privileging
Western actors as global agents and dismissing non-Western actors as “local,” “indig-
enous,” or somehow particularized,59 these histories of science emphasize the way go-
betweens have often been more “cosmopolitan” than counterparts who remained in the
metropole.6055 For one of the best-known and most controversial proponents of the idea that modern science was
disseminated to non-Western parts of the world and that non-Western societies were merely passive
receptors of scientiﬁc knowledge, see Basalla, “Spread of Western Science” (cit. n. 8).
56 Warwick Anderson, “Introduction: Postcolonial Technoscience,” Soc. Stud. Sci. 32 (2002): 643–
48, on 644.
57 Daniela Bleichmar, Visible Empire: Botanical Expeditions and Visual Culture in the Hispanic En-
lightenment (Chicago, 2012); Antonio Barrera-Osorio, Experiencing Nature: The Spanish American
Empire and the Early Scientiﬁc Revolution (Austin, Tex., 2006); Neil Saﬁer, Measuring the New
World: Enlightenment Science and South America (Chicago, 2008); Bernard V. Lightman et al.,
eds., The Circulation of Knowledge between Britain, India, and China: The Early-Modern World
to the Twentieth Century (Leiden, 2013).
58 Raj, Relocating Modern Science (cit. n. 12); Simon Schaffer, Lissa Roberts, Kapil Raj, and James
Delbourgo, eds., The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770–1820 (Sagamore
Beach, Mass., 2009).
59 Some work that falls more squarely in the postcolonial framework of exploring the transmission
of knowledge from the metropole to the colony has still tended to treat Western actors as the “global”
actor, and the non-Western agents as the “local,” and particularized, or “indigenous” agent.
60 Translators and diplomats, Chinese and Naxi guides to British botanists, and native informers to
colonial scientists in early twentieth-century Africa are but a few examples of ﬁgures who participated
in transnational circuits of knowledge and materials, actively helping to constitute modern science. On
translators and diplomats, see Raj, Relocating Modern Science (cit. n. 12); Marwa Elshakry, Reading
Darwin in Arabic, 1860–1950 (Chicago, 2013). On Chinese and Naxi guides to imperialist botanists,
see Fa-ti Fan, British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2004); and Erik Mueggler, The Paper Road: Archive and Experience in the Botanical
Exploration of West China and Tibet (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2011), respectively. On African in-
formers to colonial naturalists, see Nancy Jacobs, Birders of Africa: History of a Network (New Ha-
ven, Conn., 2016); Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Prob-
lem of Scientiﬁc Knowledge, 1870–1950 (Chicago, 2011). In this light, Jesuits might be seen not as
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INTRODUCTION 21With the term “broker” being so intimately associated with economic exchange
and circulation, it strikes us that our interest in the entangled history of science
and capitalism would similarly beneﬁt by being approached as a story of linkages that
emphasizes practices of brokerage and translation, points of convergence, and glob-
ally circulating networks of expertise and material, and that eschews the dichotomies
of “global/local,” “West/rest,” and others. Indeed, several of our contributors ap-
proach their case studies in this manner, focusing on points of convergence and bro-
kers that have facilitated the global circulation of both science and capitalism in the
period spanning the nineteenth to twenty-ﬁrst centuries. Singerman’s “Sugar Ma-
chines” looks at one of the quintessential commodities of modern capitalism—sugar—
and recovers the key historical actors—a coterie of Glasgow-based engineers—and
their ceaseless intellectual and physical labor that went into maintaining the fragile ma-
terial infrastructure of nineteenth-century transnational sugar production.61 Ghosh, fo-
cusing on a much more recent era, demonstrates how Soviet theoreticians and statisti-
cians were global actors who helped circulate socialist statistics to other parts of the
emerging socialist world, including China.62 This transnational circuit of knowledge
producers generated a form of statistics that was not somehow derivative of authentic
capitalist statistics but emerged as a calculative culture of the socialist world that
made sense within the geopolitical context of the Cold War. In his study of BGI, Ste-
vens sheds light on how this hybrid research center was not merely an imitation of the
Western factory, engaged in rampant copying (asWestern journalists regularly charge),
but functions as a “broker” of sorts. He argues that BGI “performs” shanzhai, a do-it-
yourself mode of innovation that reﬂects Shenzhen’s biotech and manufacturing cul-
ture more generally and relies on the ability to copy and adapt in order to compete ef-
fectively on a global scale.63
While the global circulation of knowledge as one among many economically valu-
able commodities offers a highly suggestive way to bring the histories of science and
capitalism into dialogue, we also see a number of dangers that emerge from the recent
enthusiasm for “knowledge in transit,” as James Secord has evocatively described
it.64 Precisely because the motif of circulation is so closely connected to both classical
and neoliberal models of the way value is generated, it behooves scholars to question
more carefully the conditions in which knowledge is made to travel. Doing so not
only means taking seriously those cases in which knowledge and things resolutely
stay put, refusing to partake in global circuits of intellectual and economic exchange.
It also requires that we take seriously the asymmetries in epistemic, economic, and
technical power that shape the way knowledge and commodities alike can be, and
have been, mobilized. For that reason, we would be remiss if we were to restrict our-
selves to the logic of circulation alone. The way knowledge and other resources are
accumulated is decisive as well, producing asymmetries and inequalities with clear61 Singerman, “Sugar Machines” (cit. n. 49).
62 Ghosh, “Lies” (cit. n. 19).
63 Stevens, “Starting” (cit. n. 23).
64 Secord, “Knowledge in Transit” (cit. n. 12).
Western missionaries transmitting religion and science from the European metropole to other parts of
the world in the early modern period, but as a cosmopolitan cadre of go-betweens who shared infor-
mation among a variety of empires as they traveled across the globe. On this point, see Laura
Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chi-
cago, 2001).
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22 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERconsequences for what can be known and who knows it. Given these considerations,
we advocate taking our cues from scholars who emphasize the arduous labor, coer-
cion, expropriation, and at times even violence that histories of the way knowledge
circulates often belie. In particular, while we agree that a claim must be widely shared
in the community to be seen as legitimate, the constitution of that very community is
achieved by creating boundaries and erecting barriers to exclude those who are not
seen to have a proper place in the group. And while we acknowledge that there
can be no doubt that efforts to promote movement and communication play an indis-
pensable role in the history of science and capitalism, these efforts always operate in
combination with concordant attempts to control, manage, and, at times, explicitly
arrest the movement of objects, ideas, and people.65
Several contributions here are explicit in their consideration not only of global cir-
culation but also of instances when movement is obstructed and circulation is ar-
rested, when exclusive communities and boundaries are erected. Lean’s essay, for ex-
ample, explores how the emerging early twentieth-century IP regime of trademark
infringement sought to obstruct the circulation of manufacturing knowledge to al-
leged Chinese copycats in order to improve global market conditions for British phar-
maceutical corporations. Fein’s essay identiﬁes the process by which Siberian “sci-
entiﬁc crude,” or natural history specimens, was decommodiﬁed in the Soviet Union
during the Stalinist period. This was not simply because of the ideological impera-
tives of a communist command economy, but more because Moscow, which was in-
vested in securing global exports at the time, ultimately came to value this particular
material more as national patrimony to be stocked domestically than as an export
commodity to be sold abroad. Sarah Milov’s contribution sheds light on how the col-
lection of data from Japanese smokers of American tobacco unexpectedly served to
underpin a grassroots movement against American big tobacco in the second half
of the twentieth century. And Fullilove’s piece demonstrates how contemporary inter-
national gene banks, which rely on botanic and Linnean classiﬁcation systems to com-
moditize biomatter, are now challenged and, indeed, being rendered obsolete by emerg-
ing biomatter commodities, such as the fungal endophyte, which feature the genome as
the key to their value. By historicizing the instances when the circulation of scientiﬁc
knowledge or capital has been obstructed, halted, or somehow altered, these essays delve
into why global ﬂows and stoppages occurred and what was at stake when they did.66
Finally, it should be noted that, even though this volume eschews any “origins”
narrative, it does seek to identify the historically speciﬁc conditions under which sci-
ence and capitalism emerged as powerful institutions and ideological regimes by the
nineteenth century. In the early modern period, the pursuit of proﬁt in rational, cal-
culative ways, along with empirical ways of knowing the natural world, did not exist
solely in the West and could be found in many parts of the world.67 Yet, even as we65 See Warwick Anderson, “Making Global Health History: The Postcolonial Worldliness of Bio-
medicine,” Soc. Hist. Med. 27 (2014): 93–113.
66 Lean, “Making the Chinese Copycat” (cit. n. 48); Fullilove, “Microbiology”; Milov, “Smoke
Ring” (both cit. n. 47).
67 These various forms of empiricism and pursuits of proﬁt did not automatically result in the de-
velopment of modern science and capitalism and must be studied on their own terms. Revisionist his-
torians of science have unearthed “non-Western” systems of natural, technological, and healing
knowledge to demonstrate how rich ways of knowing that appear to mirror the empiricism of Western
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INTRODUCTION 23recognize the historical existence of multiple forms of empiricism, we are interested
in historicizing the speciﬁc conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—
including, crucially, imperial encounters and global exchange—under which speciﬁc
forms of empiricism did develop to justify and underlie practices of pursuing proﬁt
and producing knowledge through extractive and often violent means. A system of
capitalist accumulation in which proﬁts were pursued with a calculated acquisitive-
ness that was predicated upon key social processes (including ways to manage labor
and deﬁne relations of production, extract material resources, and rearrange geopo-
litical dynamics) emerged to guarantee ever-cheaper costs of industrial capital. So,
too, did conditions that enabled scientiﬁc knowledge production that claimed to be
value neutral and free of economic and political implication, even as that knowledge
was in fact dependent upon extractive approaches to data collection, called for a par-
ticular exploitative relationship toward the natural world and was often inextricably
linked with capital or state power. Taken together, these developments in science and
capitalism came to radically reshape economic and epistemological practice around
the world, reconﬁgure relations of production, labor regimes, and geopolitical dy-
namics, as well as usher in new ways of understanding and interacting with the nat-
ural world.
To better understand the historically speciﬁc conditions under which the nineteenth-
century coproduction of science and capitalism occurred, we include several Euro-
pean case studies from the early modern period. Again, not seeking the “origins”
of science or capitalism, these pieces seek to help decenter any origins narrative from
within by refusing a teleological perspective and attending to the historically contin-
gent circumstances that informed economic and epistemological practices—the knowl-
edge work—that did emerge. Some of these practices documented in these essays
were retrospectively deemed the “roots” of science and capitalism. Some were not.
Deringer’s and Giraudeau’s contributions, for instance, both recover epistemic prac-
tices of calculation that did not inexorably lead to capitalism and science. In showcas-
ing multiple ways that an early modern ﬁnancier might have calculated futures,
Deringer, for example, uncovers methods of the early modern era on their own terms
that were rendered obsolete when compound-interest discounting became “black-
boxed” in modern capitalist practices. In an investigation into how market demand
for lamb during the off-season engendered new breeding techniques and ways to
shape the environment, Pawley similarly avoids a straightforward story of rationality
or pure market demand for mid-eighteenth-century British agricultural capitalism. In-
stead, she shows us how this new system engendered a host of actors—botanists,
physicians, professional feeders—invested in maintaining a system that rested ontechnoscience did not inevitably lead to the rise of modern science, but proved productive, generative,
and instrumental for a host of other institutional and ideological purposes. For examples in the case of
early modern China, see Benjamin Elman,On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900 (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2005), who documents how the rise of empirical studies in Qing China, where philo-
logical and evidentiary knowledge was applied to knowing the cosmos for purposes of moral culti-
vation and imperial politics. Far from a “failure” or missed opportunity on the part of the Qing to
develop an exact Chinese analogue to European capitalism or Western science, this application of pre-
cise knowledge for purposes of moral and political power made perfect sense within the institutional
and cultural context of a vibrant early modern empire. For another study that examines the production
of scientiﬁc—in particular, cartographic and ethnographic—knowledge in the context of the Qing em-
pire in its own right (in contrast to the “empire” of “science and empire” studies, which is implicitly
always assumed to be Western imperialism), see Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise (cit. n. 60).
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24 RIEPPEL, LEAN, AND DERINGERwhat might be seen as an illogical practice of manipulating what were natural rhythms
in sheep reproduction. If these three essays examine the eighteenth century, the re-
maining contributors examine science and capitalism from around the world during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Together, the pieces from the modern period
until today document how the complex entanglement of science and capitalism was
hardly a development that simply moved from the West to the rest after a point of
purported divergence. Instead, this entanglement has continuously evolved and re-
made itself via global and transnational connections and obstructions. And it has
done so in a variety of locations and in a variety of ways.This content downloaded from 128.059.222.107 on November 12, 2019 12:22:17 PM
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